Violence is down in Baghdad and the American and Iraqi governments must capitalize on the relative peace.
November 11, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told reporters that terrorist attacks in the Iraqi capital have fallen 77 percent over the past year, “we were able...to drive Baghdad from its dark, black days into a brighter time that people feel optimistic about.” The Prime Minister’s cheery assessment (and somewhat vague statistical analysis) may overstate Iraqis’ optimism, but a consensus is emerging among American and Iraqi officials that violence in Baghdad has lessened significantly since the American troop “surge” began in February. The “surge” is the Bush administration’s deployment of 20,000 additional American troops to Baghdad and Anbar Provence. In Baghdad, surging troops were embedded with Iraqi military and police units, to whom American forces provided training and equipment. Violence is decreasing. Baghdad’s most powerful militia-leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, has instructed his Mahdi Army to ceasefire and al-Qaeda in Iraq has been marginalized considerably in the capital.
The Bush administration must adopt new strategies in order to capitalize on Baghdad’s renewed stability and to encourage similar progress in other parts of Iraq. Security will continue to be the military’s top priority, but the emphasis must now be focused on recruiting and training Baghdadis to police. Of late, the military has accumulated many more recruits, particularly in Sunni-dominated areas of Baghdad. These recruits, known as Concerned Local Citizens, patrol Sunni neighborhoods on behalf of the city’s police force; for this service they are compensated $300 per month. This recruitment strategy is providing employment to Baghdadis, incorporating more Sunnis into the city’s police force (Sunni Iraqis are underrepresented in the police and in the military), and providing additional security in some of Baghdad’s most dangerous neighborhoods. Moreover, local militias (including al-Qaeda in Iraq) are also courting these same Sunni Baghdadis and by outbidding these militias, the U.S. is hindering their ability to recruit.
The American military is also building alliances with Sunnis outside Baghdad. In Anbar province, the U.S. has been recruiting Sunni militias to battle al-Qaeda and likeminded insurgent groups. If the U.S. is able to cooperate militarily with militias in Anbar – some of which initially fought against the American military – than it should be able to work with militias in Baghdad to distribute aid and to rebuild the city’s war-torn infrastructure. It is particularly essential that the American military (and the Iraqi government) cooperate with al-Sadr’s Shia militia, known as the Mahdi Army, which dominates Sadr City, an especially destitute area of Baghdad. The distribution of water and electricity and the completion of reconstruction projects are critical to Iraqi communities and economies. Baghdad’s relative peace should facilitate some development, particularly if local militias participate.
Development has been hindered by the Iraqi government’s inability to agree on anything. The government has not established a federal budget or decided how to distribute oil revenue. Thus far, the surge strategy has improved security, but Iraqi politicians must overcome their ambivalence if post-surge plans for development are to succeed.
The surge is working because, for the first time, the U.S. is stationing an adequate number of troops in Baghdad. However, if surging troops are withdrawn prematurely or too rapidly, Baghdad will descend back into chaos. Few, if any, Iraqi security divisions are competent to operate without American military support, and stability is entirely contingent on America’s military presence. Many Americans are clamoring for large-scale troop withdrawals, but it is critical that some American military personnel remain indefinitely to supervise Iraqi soldiers and police in Baghdad and elsewhere. The strategies that are succeeding in Baghdad and Anbar should be exported to other parts of Iraq where violence persists. Instead of withdrawing surging troops, American policymakers should consider redeploying them in southern Iraq.
Security is a means to an end, that end being the establishment of a functioning nation. The surge is creating the security that may facilitate the completion of reconstruction projects necessary for Iraq to function, but the American and Iraqi governments must quickly implement developmental policies in order to capitalize on the relative peace in Baghdad.
Bull, Bartle. 'Mission Accomplished.' Prospect. October 2007.
Galbraith, Peter W. 'The Surge.' The New York Review of Books. Volume 54, Number 4. March 15, 2007.
Muir, Jim. 'Is Iraq Getting Better.' BBC. November 11, 2007.
